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ABSTRACT 
 
A STUDY ON THE ROLE OF TAX AMNESTIES IN PERSONAL INCOME TAX 
COMPLIANCE IN SRI LANKA 
 
By 
 
R.M.Jayasinghe 
 
 
Tax compliance is a vital requirement for a tax system, since it assists and decisively 
determines success of the other functions of tax administration: assessment and collection.  A 
wide range of different measures to facilitate and enforce compliance are implemented by tax 
administrations around the world.  In Sri Lanka, for achieving this objective, more emphasis 
has been placed on punitive measures.  In addition, tax amnesties have frequently been 
introduced as to allow wrong-doers to reveal their evasions without being subjected to tax 
liabilities, penalties and prosecutions.  But still compliance is not satisfactory and paves the 
way for mass-scale evasions, in government’s view.  However, impact of tax amnesties on 
personal income tax compliance in Sri Lanka have not yet been studied, even amongst 
declaration of frequent amnesties.  In this context, by using pre and post amnesty movements 
of tax revenue and number of files, this thesis attempts to fill that vacuum by checking the 
role played by tax amnesties in compliance enhancement.  Emphasizing on tax amnesties 
granted in 2003 and 2009, it tries to establish impact of amnesties on compliance within the 
prevailing situation of tax system of Sri Lanka.  Results of this study suggest that these 
amnesties do not seem to have effectively increased number of personal income taxpayers, 
tax revenue and thus short-run compliance of personal income tax within the status quo of Sri 
Lankan tax system. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Public finance addresses both directly and indirectly the question of enhancing living 
standard of the public. Payouts of many governments consist of recurring expenditure in the 
caliber of education, health, welfare, security, maintenance of legal system etc. On the other 
hand, the governments are supposed to provide and maintain infrastructure for smooth 
functioning of the economy. Hence, a colossal sum of capital expenditure has to be incurred 
on non profit making projects and activities that do not attract investments from private sector 
organizations.  
The major share of the government revenue, the other side of the equation, usually 
comes through numerous taxes, whether it is a developed or developing country. Generating 
revenue to finance the Government’s unavoidable or must do endeavors has become 
immensely necessary. The tax system of a country must be designed to collect the taxes in the 
most efficient and equitable way possible. In developing countries with emerging markets, 
especially in those that aim at becoming integrated with the international economy, tax policy 
must play a particularly sensitive role. This situation is common to Sri Lanka, which is facing 
budget deficit as a result of inadequate revenue streams. The overall budget deficit has been 
approximately 10% of the GDP for the last few years and it has been financed through both 
foreign and domestic means.  
In Sri Lanka, tax revenue as a percentage of total revenue of the government was 
89.37% and 88.08% in 2008 and 2009 respectively. Inland Revenue Department (IRD) which 
administers mainly income tax (IT) and value added tax (VAT) collected Sri Lankan Rupees 
441.65 billion, which was 62.86% of the total government revenue in 2009. Income tax (both 
corporate income tax and personal income tax) contributed to Rs 139.55 billion being 
31.59 % of the total collection of the IRD. Individual income tax (mostly referred as personal 
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income tax in Sri Lanka) was responsible for Rs 65.32 billion in 2009.  This amount, as seen 
by expert analysts, could have been more, had it been brought the potential revenue that 
might have been deprived by low compliance to the tax law by Sri Lankan citizens. Weak 
compliance is undoubtedly a reason to undermine tax revenue in Sri Lanka. 
Prosecution and imposition of penalties on offenders especially those who do not 
submit annual tax declarations have been widely used for countering weak-compliance 
problem in Sri Lanka.  The other measures include auditing, investigations, collection of tax 
at source (withholding tax), gathering information, field surveys and maintenance of taxpayer 
assistance centre etcetera.  In addition, several tax amnesties have also been declared from 
time to time to enhance compliance. These amnesties have been used when other compliance 
enhancing measures fail to deliver the goods.   
Although tax amnesties are not recommended to be introduced repeatedly by many 
writers, who have researched on them, some countries are having a practice of declaring 
repeated amnesties.1   Confirming this scenario, Sri Lanka has employed 10 tax amnesties 
staring from 1964, whilst the latest was in 2009. The government seems to rate tax amnesties 
as better compliance enhancing equipment.    
A typical tax amnesty is an opportunity for tax paying citizens to pay their taxes 
without penalty. The objective of introducing tax amnesty is to increase short term revenue.  
Thus under most of the amnesties, pardon is granted for penalty amounts. It means the tax 
defaulters are allowed to pay the past taxes without penalty before a specified date. But Sri 
Lankan experience on this aspect is rare as full immunity has been granted under all recent 
amnesties, without collecting any back taxes.  They were focused to attract new tax payers to 
the tax net and to draw current tax payers’ undisclosed sources of income to the tax net as 
well. Government’s final aim was to enhance the tax payers’ compliance and, thereby, 
                                                 
1 The governments of many countries including Argentina. Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, India , Pakistan and 
the Philippines have also introduced several amnesties. 
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increase the Govermnment revenue. The amnesties of 2003 and 2009 provided forgiveness 
and exoneration for past dues concerning income tax whilst non-implementation of 
investigations and prosecution provisions of the tax statute was guaranteed.  
Adequate studies as to ascertain the effectiveness of tax amnesties on income tax 
compliance in Sri Lanka, i.e. whether amnesties have enhanced compliance or not within the 
status quo of the tax system, have not been carried out as yet.  Hence, my intension of this 
research is to try and fill this vacuum which will be helpful for arriving at recommendation 
for vital policy and strategic requirements for bettering the situation from its status quo.   
This study aims and revolves around establishing effects of amnesties on income tax 
compliance in Sri Lanka. Short-run effects of 2003 and 2009 amnesties will be analyzed in 
the following ways2.   
 As the first objective, the personal income tax compliance of post amnesty period 
is checked in comparison to pre amnesty period and assess whether the amnesties 
seem to have enhanced compliance within the prevailing situation of the tax 
system. The pre and post amnesty figures of number of personal income tax files 
and revenue are analyzed for this purpose. 
 Secondly, if the objective of the amnesties have not been achieved (i.e. income tax 
compliance has not been increased ) I try to identify the actual circumstances 
behind such failures depending on the theoretical matters reviewed , and 
 Lastly, to recommend necessary policy changes and specific strategies with 
measures for tax system and administration to enhance compliance, in the light of 
theoretical review and empirical results.  
 
                                                 
2 Most of the amnesties introduced prior to 2003 did not attract tax dodges and only a few declarations received 
in many cases.  No declaration was requested under the amnesty in 2008 but non filers were asked to get the tax 
files opened in the Department of Inland Revenue without paying past taxes .  Details of performances are rare 
to be found in cases of these amnesties. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Issues Relating to Income Tax Compliance and Tax Amnesties  
– A Theoretical Framework 
 
A. Income Tax Compliance:- 
Income tax compliance simply means “the payment of income taxes as required by 
the legislation”. American Bar Association (1987) defines Income Tax Compliance as “the 
timely filing and reporting of required tax information, the correct self assessment of taxes 
owed and the timely payment of those taxes without enforcement action”.  Mere submission 
of income tax return does not fit for the whole requirements. Disclosing of correct income 
and in-time payments are also important. The primary function of tax administration would 
appear to be monitoring compliance and apply the sanctions prescribed in the statute against 
the offenders as pointed out by Bagchi, Bird and Das- Gupta (1994). If income tax 
compliance continues to be unsatisfactory, the major functions of tax administration- 
scrutinizing of tax returns, assessments & collections- are delayed and tend to lack 
momentum jeopardizing the government coffer.  
Non compliance of income tax brings detrimental consequences to the economies by 
reducing the government revenue and, thereby, increasing government debts. Non 
compliance of income tax affects the government revenue in various ways.  
• Non compliers do not pay the taxes to the government and it directly reduces the 
potential revenue of the government. 
• Law-abiding taxpayers’ dissatisfy as to why they should pay tax, while others do not 
pay the taxes on their actual income. This feeling of discourage among the citizens 
creates tax evasion and it decreases the government revenue in the long run. 
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• When existing taxpayers are not compliant in providing correct information, it is 
difficult for the tax administration to know about their transactions with other parties 
and thus new taxpayers including those who engage in economic activities that do not 
come to the surface cannot be identified and taxed. This minimizes the government 
revenue. 
Economic growth of a country is considerably affected by its citizens’ tax compliance 
behavior. Serra (2003) points out that improving tax compliance, due to various programmes 
to increase enforcement and taxpayer services, had been responsible for rapid economic 
growth in Chile during 1990s.   
Most tax administrations around the world adopt combined mechanisms of both 
facilitating approach and confronting approach to enhance tax compliance. Taxpayer services 
with consulting, guidance and tax education etc are provided in the former, whilst tax 
enforcement by way of investigations, imposition of penalties, prosecution is committed in 
the latter.  Measures such as gathering of information and withholding tax etcetera are also 
used to enhance compliance as additional features of the latter.   
Despite these measures a majority of taxpayers in developing countries, is reluctant to 
pay their taxes, especially direct taxes in the caliber of income tax since it reduces resources 
and economic vigor of the tax payers. This feeling of a taxpayer is inspired from various 
political, economic and social reasons.  Moreover, level of compliance varies from country to 
country, time to time and among various taxes, depending on contexts including effectiveness 
of efforts by tax administration to enforce compliance. 
 
B. Incidence and Prevalence of Tax Amnesties 
When business activities and financial systems are greatly evolved with globalization, 
draining of a section of such activities without coming to the surface of tax jurisdiction is 
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inevitable. The money or other assets accumulated through this way is generally called black 
money.  Such streams emerge within the borderlines of a country as a result of immoral 
attitude of the citizens or illegal nature of such economic activities.   
A portion of legitimate activities may not be taxable due to tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
Deliberate non declaration or under-declaration of tax base, misuse of tax rates and creation 
of tax violating business arrangements are coming under the tax evasion. Tax avoidance 
means the planning of business structures and business transactions within the law so as to 
minimize the final composite amount of taxes. Evasion is illegal & immoral. But tax planning 
within the law (tax avoidance) is not illegal & immoral and does not form non-compliance, as 
accepted commonly. A need arises for bringing the undisclosed assets, made up using tax-
evaded income, to the formal (in other way lawful and moral) tax net and ensuring future 
compliance of such citizens.   
The other portion of the black money represents the proceeds of crime. Today, an 
emerging issue of concern to the economists throughout the world is Money Laundering.  
“Money laundering”, stripped of its technical connotation, refers to an attempt convert what 
is commonly referred to as   “dirty money” into respectable assets. There are several technical 
definitions of “money laundering”; perhaps the simplest is the one that describes it as  
“the process of converting cash, or other property which is derived from 
criminal activity, so as to give it the appearance of having been obtained from 
a legitimate source.”  (McDonell, 1997)   
 
The crimes discussed here are drug trafficking, human trafficking, prostitution, gambling, 
arms deals, smuggling, securities scam, pornography, fraud, bribe, corruption and so on. The 
noticeable attribute of these money launderers is that they extremely use the financial systems 
to convert their dirty money into white whereas they always try to be hidden from the tax 
authorities.  They perceive the financial system as service-oriented while the tax authority as 
enforcement-oriented. Prevalence of underground economic activities that are not easy to be 
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tackled by a tax administration with the limited resources or other restrictions may cause tax 
compliance problems, avoiding the reach of tax revenue to its potentiality. However, it is the 
tax authority’s judgement that only a tiny part of crime proceeds is visible through tax files. 
The lion’s share is out of the tax net. The subsequent generations of income of these funds 
(second income stream and so on) also tend to be hidden because of the fear of detection of 
the original crime. In the above context, coupled with economic point of view, it is rational to 
think that tax negation will bring such black money into tax files.   
  Moreover, if there are a huge number of citizens who engage in informal sector 
activities and occupations (unorganized economic activities), organized non-compliance and 
tax evasions could have amassed a huge stock of wealth which they do not invest in rightful 
activities as to avoid taxation problems.  Investments in such rightful economic activities, 
however, are vital for the development of a country.  If such citizens are given tax breaks and 
thereafter the specific fields and activities of investment are streamlined, the undisclosed 
wealth can be absorbed to the essential sectors, perhaps by repatriation. Thus the capital stock 
of the country can be increased. 
Tax amnesty, which is advocated as compliance enhancing tool, is a strategic measure, 
widely used to tackle such low compliance situations. Bringing of tax evading citizens and 
non compliers into the tax net voluntarily is the main objective of tax amnesty.  For this 
purpose, in many cases, penalty forgiveness for payment of past taxes is granted3. In rare 
number of cases, we can find full forgiveness for past taxes. Further “carrots” such as non-
implementation of legislative powers related to investigation & prosecution are guaranteed 
for the declarants.  It’s a sovereign act of forgiveness by a government to all citizens.   
                                                 
3 Generally, if the income tax is not paid in time, a penalty is added to the delayed tax payments on the basis of 
period of delay and both tax plus penalty is collected by the tax authorities.  
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C. Previous Findings on Tax Amnesties 
Whilst approaching other important areas to build up our reasoning, it is worthwhile 
and necessary to review some of the previous work on amnesties. Table 2.1 indicates basic 
characteristics of amnesties implemented in some countries. As the official data relating to 
the performance of amnesties is scarce, mostly as a result of secrecy provisions attached to 
amnesties, empirical evidence on effects of amnesties is also rare. But we can come across 
more important findings even in that limited number of empirical works.  
In many countries tax amnesties are introduced for compliance boom and short term 
revenue climb.  Both these aspects of tax amnesties should be touched in a study of tax 
amnesties. 
Most tax amnesties were designed to grant waiver of penalties. Back taxes could be 
payable without penalty. In most of these cases it was guaranteed a protection from 
prosecution and investigation too. These amnesties have raised short-run revenues on many 
occasions.  For example Indian amnesty of 1997 and some state amnesties in the United 
States have been successful in raising short term revenues.  
However, performance of an amnesty, in enhancing compliance and improving 
revenue depends on several factors including nature of the amnesty, probability of future 
replica, change of enforcement and credibility of guaranteed benefits etcetera. Theoretically, 
compliance patterns of pre amnesty period could change in post amnesty period as a result of 
the introduction of an amnesty.  In some cases, such changes might be difficult to be seen in 
practice, as it depends on nature of the amnesty itself and several other factors. 
Tax amnesties are justified as the last opportunity for evaders to pay taxes and 
legitimize their activities.  This rationale is controversially identified to be based on the 
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principle of equity.  However, several kinds of benefits of tax amnesties from the part of the 
government can be identified.   
Table 1 –Some Experiences around the world 
 
Country and Amnesty Characteristics and Experience 
India – 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
Argentina – 1987 
 
 
 
 
 
Massachusetts – 1983-
1984 
 
 
 
France - 1986 
 
Revenue collecting amnesty 
Declared to the last amnesty in India 
Highly publicized 
Enforcement Strengthened 
Ended in tremendous success in revenue raising 
 
Introduced to repatriate capital 
Exempted from all taxes 
Not accompanied by increase of enforcement or changes to fiscal 
system 
Identified as a failure 
 
Revenue collecting amnesty 
Highly publicized 
Combined with emphasis on enforcement 
Wildly successful 
 
Revenue collecting amnesty 
Reduced tax rates on repatriated capital 
Not combined with increased enforcement or greater penalties 
Unsuccessful 
Sources :    Alm (1998)  
 Leonard and Zeckhauser (1986) 
 
First is the collection of tax amounts at relatively low administrative and collection costs, 
which are difficult to be collected under prevailing situations.  This is the mostly talked short 
term revenue goal and most governments enact amnesties in this perspective.  Second is the 
increase of compliance with granting of an opportunity to correct past evasion from the part 
of previously non-compliant citizens.  With an increased number of taxpayers submitting 
their tax returns, the voluntary compliance should increase.  As pointed out by Leonard and 
Zeckhauser (1987) some citizens become tax delinquents by mistakes and would now like to 
become honest citizens. Amnesties help them to correct their errors and thus it also has a 
positive impact on compliance. 
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Except the benefits that have been reasoned out as controversial in line with previous 
research findings, there exist costs as well.   
First is the relatively small revenue collection even from the most publicized 
amnesties, as pointed out by Alm (1998).  Even for collecting such low amounts numerous 
benefits - surrendering the taxing rights concerning investigations and prosecutions - are 
granted to the declarants.  In many amnesty programmes, existing taxpayers are also forgiven 
for past evasions.  The tax administration has to give up all audit and investigation works that 
could collect some additional revenue.  
Secondly and most importantly, dissatisfaction among law-abiding taxpayers (more 
broadly law-abiding citizens) with the feeling of unequal treatment might lead them not to 
comply with tax laws in the long-run.  Feeling that “the offenders are being forgiven while 
the honest pay their dues” is the reason for this. Same way the feeling of “Even the honest 
evade taxes, they also can escape or enjoy pardon like the offenders do” will affect the tax 
morale of the country giving adverse effects on compliance process. “If the majority of 
citizens voluntarily comply with tax laws, the option of an amnesty for a small group of 
evaders can be understood by a majority as a violation of equity” according to Torgler and 
Schaltegger (2003). Moreover, amnesties reveal the existence of vast-spreading tax evasions 
in the society and the tender treatments of tax administration towards evaders. All such 
factors change the mindset of the public along with behavior and responsiveness.  That is 
decisive for the long-run compliance and revenue.   
On the other hand, some of the previous evaders who have been brought into the 
books after the amnesty, cannot be trusted that they will not go back to their beaten track and 
become repeated offenders, when there are no effective post monitoring and enforcement 
efforts or once they become sluggish due to various reasons.  This can be a second reason to 
decline post-amnesty compliance. 
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As the most important area, the objective of an amnesty revolves around post-amnesty 
compliance.  Although compliance depends on several factors, as we have already 
emphasized, had an amnesty been successful, it should have effectively increased post-
amnesty compliance, ceteris paribus.  Vigorous enforcement measures including prosecutions, 
investigations, tax audit and withholding provisions coupled with taxpayer services like 
consultation and tax education would play a decisive role to ensure compliance.  Both new 
taxpayers and existing taxpayers who declare their correct income during and after the 
amnesty should be monitored and enforced properly.   That is to avoid those with bad track 
records going back to their familiar situations and the honest becoming less compliant with 
dissatisfaction over the introduction of amnesties.  Amnesties without proper post 
enforcement are found to be unsuccessful, as a decrease of ex-post level of compliance is 
most probable in such situations.  This rationale establishes a scenario that amnesties are 
introduced only to identify evaders and evaded amounts which could have been approached 
without revenue, if tax administrations had been alert and strong enough to work for 
achieving its objectives.  Nevertheless, counter-arguments that “introduction of an amnesty is 
necessary before strengthening compliance enforcement mechanism” also prevail. 
In line with previous findings, law-abiding taxpayers become dissatisfied with 
amnesties and become knowledgeable of the prevalence of evasion when an amnesty is 
introduced.  It should affect adversely on their compliance.  Moreover, those who were afraid 
of the law and paid taxes because of the “sticks” are no more afraid as they can evade taxes 
and come under a future amnesty.  If an amnesty lessen guilt as a motivating factor with its 
signals, post-amnesty compliance is likely to decline according to Alm (1998).  Punishment 
is, however, one decisive factor for the behavior of taxpayers.  This is in par with Becker’s 
crime and punishment theory’ (1968). Dependence of tax evasion on probability of detection 
and punishment is established by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), in early literature on tax 
12 
 
evasion.  Neither the probability of detection nor punishment pursues taxpayers towards 
unwilling compliance as a result of the guaranteed protection from an amnesty.  Prevalence 
of possible replica of amnesties in the future, rather than anticipated thorough enforcement 
should further discourage compliance.  As the introduction of amnesties certainly reduce 
costs of evasion, a drop of compliance level is unarguably probable from the part of those, 
who had previously been motivated by such sticks. 
Amnesties might not enhance compliance, when inefficiencies of tax systems, 
shielding wrong doers and motivating the honest for wrong doing, continue to prevail.  
Furthermore, such weaknesses might prompt frequent amnesties in a vicious circle, when 
government’s reliance on amnesties is high instead of enforcing and facilitating compliance. 
According to Resnick, who analyzed effectiveness of state amnesties of the United 
States during 1982 – 2002.  “Amnesty is not a strategy that can be overused since successive 
programmes will naturally yield smaller returns and may provide subtle incentives for tax 
evasion as taxpayers rely on the opportunity to pay back taxes penalty free”. Amnesties, said 
to be the last opportunity for evaders, are mostly repeated by some countries in practice.  
Then citizens having tax evaded assets expect future amnesties that can be used to reveal 
their past evasions. Even the present compliers drop their compliance under these 
circumstances, since such income can be declared during future grace periods.  
However, in an array of empirical studies on amnesties, developed hypotheses mostly 
reveal controversies on reaching objectives of amnesties.   
First, the literature emphasizes that if compliance is unsatisfactory and an amnesty is 
intended to be introduced, the circumstances behind the status quo should be thoroughly 
studied. Alm(1998) points out, that if the prevailing problems of a tax system are not 
addressed by an amnesty, an amnesty is likely to do more harm than good.  The authorities 
must assess the overall level of voluntary tax compliance, current quality of tax enforcement 
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and prospective changes to it. Moreover, the long run revenue impact of an amnesty is likely 
to be negative according to him.  
In an empirical work, Alm and Beck (1993), who analyzed the effects of Colorado tax 
amnesty of 1985, also found that the long run revenue impact of amnesty is likely to be 
negative.  Moreover, Alm et at (1990) points out that average level of compliance falls after 
an amnesty, inter alia. 
Empirical work by Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1995) also supported the hypothesis 
of adverse compliance effects of amnesties and confirmed the falling penalty collections 
overwhelm the direct gains from an amnesty.  Only 1975 amnesty from all amnesties 
introduced in India between 1965 and 1993 appeared to have had positive impact on revenue. 
Another issue, theoretically arises, is relating to the legitimacy of tax provisions and 
the political nature of amnesties.  According to Leonard and Zeckhauser (1987) “an amnesty 
is a political instrument”. They further emphasize that the reduction of penalty must be 
coupled with a promise of more vigorous future enforcement.  According to them some 
elements of amnesty will support and other elements will undermine the legitimacy of the tax 
system and tax revenues that it collects.  Given the salience of taxes in citizen’s interaction 
with the government, a tax amnesty may also affect the perceived overall legitimacy of 
government” according to them.  When mistrust, from the part of the public, about the tax 
system and the government inspires based on this situation, the unavoidable result will be a 
gradual decrease of compliance. 
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CHPTER THREE 
 
Income Tax Compliance and Tax Amnesties in Sri Lanka 
 
A. Level of Individual Income Tax Compliance in Sri Lanka 
In Sri Lanka the volume of economic activities started to expand since liberalizing the 
economy in 1977.  Acquisition of private properties has been on the rise.  Growth of 
population was around 1.5 during the past period while total population was 19.9 million 
approximately in 2009. However, the number of individual tax payers having with income 
tax files has always been less than 2 % of the total population. Even in the foresaid income 
tax files, it is doubtful whether the correct amounts of taxes are paid as reiteratively suspected 
by the government.  The ultimate consequence of such a climate is a definite loss of revenue 
to the government. 
Achievement of possible maximum compliance for taxes is the primary objective of 
any tax administration in the world.  Being the main contributor to the government revenue of 
Sri Lanka, Inland Revenue Department (IRD), administers income tax and several other taxes.  
Various measures are implemented by the IRD to enhance individual income tax compliance.   
Even among the tax payers already in the tax net, the compliance is not much good. 
The submission of income tax returns, measured as one month after the deadline has 
remained between 50% - 60% of the registered taxpayers (Table 3.1).  Even though 
submission of returns reaches 75% or more after one year of the deadline, some returns are 
without financial statements and other necessary information and sometimes being mere “nil”  
returns. Then the overall tax compliance in these cases cannot be said to have been achieved 
since the mere submission of returns does not satisfy all conditions of compliance. 
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Table 2 – Income Tax Filling Compliance Rates in Sri Lanka 
(Returns Field as a Percentage of Total Income Tax Files) 
Year                                      Measured at one month                          After 13 months of the 
                                                After the Statutory Deadline                    statutory deadline  
2006                                                     52%                                                           81% 
2007                                                     59%                                                           86% 
2008                                                     58%                                                           82% 
2009                                                     50%                                                           * 
Source : Administration  Reports of Commissioner  General of Inland Revenue (CGIR) 
 
Tax compliance is the ultimate outcome of different factors.  As in any other country, 
effectiveness of the compliance enhancement efforts of tax administration is one of the main 
determinants of the compliance in Sri Lanka.  Economic climate forms another decisive 
determinant.  Furthermore, political and social climate that affects individual ideas should 
also contribute for the compliance level. 
The mechanism adopted by the IRD to raise individual income tax compliance in Sri 
Lanka is two folded. First one is the measures for facilitation. Second is the enforcement 
measure. 
Facilitating of taxpayers’ compliance by giving instructions on their problems is 
performed through a taxpayer assistance centre.  In addition, a ‘Taxpayer Services Unit’ was 
established to assist taxpayers in 2002 with the declaration of 2003 tax amnesty. 
Enforcement approach consists of various measures. Inland Revenue Acts No 28 of 
1979, No 38 of 2000 and No 10 of 2006, the legislation governing income tax in Sri Lanka, 
includes many provisions for deterring non-compliance and monitoring of taxpayer 
compliance.  Quarterly self- assessed tax payments shall be made on prescribed dates prior to 
making the final payment.  Penal provisions are implemented against breaches of this law.  
Commissioner General of Inland Revenue has the power to impose such penalties.  
Imposition of penalties on non – filers in the registered tax payers’ list is the most commonly 
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used tool for deterring non-compliance.  Moreover, taxpayers are prosecuted before 
Magistrate Courts for failure to submit returns. Furthermore; the law provides necessary 
sanctions against submission of incorrect returns and information. 
Secondly, as a necessary feature to enforce compliance, IRD has to ascertain the 
accuracy of income declared and tax paid.  Information collected from external sources is 
used for this purpose, in addition to the financial statements, submitted with returns.  A 
process of rapid audits is carried out and returns with problems are selected for detailed 
audits or field investigations.  Thus, the motive of carrying out audit has two dimensions.  
First is to arrive at correct tax liability of taxpayers.  Second is to enhance the compliance of 
others who engage in business dealings with them by collecting information relating such 
transactions. 
Thirdly, withholding taxes are also used as stimuli to enhance compliance. 
Mechanism adopted for collection of tax at source comprises following streams. 
(a) Withholding tax on interest: Banks and other financial institutions should 
deduct a withholding tax at 10% on the total interest payable to any person 
(Subject to certain provisions and exceptions) and remit it to the IRD, in 
accordance with the legislation. 
(b) Pay –As-You-Earn scheme (on Profits from employment):  Employees of 
private sector organizations are subjected for PAYE tax on the point of salary 
earnings. 
(c) Withholding tax on dividends 
(d) Withholding tax on specified fees. Certain receipts are subjected to 
withholding tax at the point of payment. 
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B. Tax Amnesties in Sri Lanka 
Tax amnesties have frequently been introduced in Sri Lanka with the objective to 
increase compliance.  Thus , tax amnesties have been declared in 1964, 1965, 1978, 1989, 
1990, 1992, 1993, 1997, 1998, 2003 and the last being in 2009. The tax amnesties in 2003 
and 2009, which are checked in this study, were introduced for both increase of short-term 
revenue and enhancement of compliance. Under both these tax amnesties back taxes were not 
collected and the declarants were totally exonerated.   
 
(I)  Mechanism of the 2003 Amnesty 
Inland Revenue (Special Provisions) Act No. 7 of 2002 (legislation that was passed by 
the parliament to introduce the 2003 amnesty) granted the immunity for income tax on 
undeclared income. The low compliance situation may have persuaded the government to 
declare a broader amnesty incomparable with former ones.  It was stated at the outset, that the 
said bill was not a premium on tax evasion but an opportunity for coming into the tax system 
without fear of being penalized.  As the Act itself states, the objective of 2003 amnesty was 
to secure future compliance of taxes in force.   Any person whether in Sri Lanka or abroad 
having income in Sri Lanka or having assets in Sri Lanka earned or acquired prior to April 1, 
2002, could make a declaration of such income and assets to the Commissioner General of 
Inland Revenue  on or before 31.08.2003.  Following is excerpts from the title of Inland 
Revenue special Provisions Act NO. 07 of 2002. 
“An act to enable persons who have not furnished a return of income and assets prior to 
march 31, 2002 to make a declaration in respect thereof: to make provision for the grant of 
certain concessions to declarants: to indemnify such persons against liability to pay certain 
taxes and against liability from investigations, prosecutions and penalties under specified 
statutes, with a view to securing the future compliance of such persons with the prevalent tax 
laws: and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto” 
   
18 
 
Thus queries, investigations and prosecutions are not contemplated to income and assets, 
declared under amnesty whilst any burden, responsibility, duty and actions already taken 
were removed.  Besides, secrecy of declarations received is strictly maintained in terms of the 
provisions of the Act.  Thus, any information with regard to declarations and latter actions by 
tax administration was not published. 
Firstly, with regard to an existing taxpayer who has filed tax returns up to 31st March 
2002, he could make a declaration under the Amnesty Act to disclose undisclosed income 
and assets up to March 31, 2002 (the end date of the year of assessment 2001/2002). Then he 
could enjoy forgiveness without any burden whatsoever.  But, from the year of assessment 
2002/20034, he should pay tax as governed under normal legislation. 
Secondly, if returns have not been filed even though income tax files were available 
or in case of those without files, they could declare all past undisclosed income and assets 
without paying any past liability. They could start paying taxes from year of assessment 
2002/2003 onwards. 
2003 amnesty resulted 51,805 declarants with past evasions, to seek for forgiveness.  
This is a huge number compared to all previous amnesties under which total declarations 
were less than 1000 as reported.   
Prevalence of a great deal of pros and cons regarding the 2003 amnesty, it has 
significant features even at the time of enacting it. The extraordinary coverage for 
unscrupulous acts and wrong doings with regard to income tax could have been the reason for 
this.  The argument behind such a wider coverage was to attracting tax dodger who was not 
convincingly motivated with previous amnesties to declare their acts of evasion.   
                                                 
4 Under the provisions of Inland Revenue Acts No 28 of 1979, 38 of 2000 and 10 of 2006 that govern income 
tax as a whole (including both personal and corporate income taxes) a year of assessment commences on April 
01 of a calendar year and ends on March 31 of the following calendar year.  Deadline for filing returns and 
making final payments is November 30th immediately following such year of assessment.  For example returns 
for year of assessment 2002/2003 should be filed on or before November 30, 2003. 
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 (ii)  Mechanism of the 2009 Amnesty 
An amendment was made to the Inland Revenue Act no 10 of 2006 with the intention of 
enhancement of Income Tax compliance from both the new tax payers and existing tax 
payers.  
 
a). Concession for new tax payers 
Any person having income earned and invested in assets in Sri Lanka or abroad could 
have an income tax file opened in the IRD and file the 2008/2009 tax return on or before 
30.11.2009 declaring such assets as at April 1, 2009. These new filers were exonerated from 
paying their past taxes. Thus queries, investigations and prosecutions are not contemplated to 
income and assets, declared in 2008/2009 return. From the year of assessment 2009/2010, he 
should pay normal taxes.  
 
b). Concession for current tax payers 
With regard to an existing taxpayer who has filed returns up to 31st March 2008, he 
could make the 2008/2009 tax return with a 20% higher tax payment over the last year’s 
payment, to disclose any amount of undisclosed income and assets up to March 31, 2009 (the 
end date of the year of assessment 2008/2009).  
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CHPTER FOUR 
Empirical Study and Data Analysis  
 
A. Research Variables and Research Methodology 
This study aims to discuss the effects of amnesties on income tax compliance in Sri 
Lanka. Two indicators have been identified to measure income tax compliance. These are the 
number of personal income tax files and personal income tax revenue. 
First, a descriptive data analysis is used to check the impact of 2003 and 2009 
amnesties by checking any climb of compliance indicators with the introduction of tax 
amnesties.  Any performance over and above the normal patterns of compliance indicators 
that happened soon after amnesty will be considered as the influence of the amnesty and 
success or failure of it will be decided accordingly. 
Secondly, these two dependent variables are investigated in separate regression 
models. Income tax compliance is a collective outcome of different factors, mainly of tax 
administration’s efforts and country’s economic situation as we have already emphasized. As 
a result of dependency of compliance on several independent variables, a multi-variable 
analysis is the best way to ascertain each variable’s impact on compliance in a given period. 
In this case tax amnesty is also identified as an independent variable among the other 
independent variables such as economic growth rate, marginal tax rate & inflation rate and its 
significance is identified in a multiple regression model.  
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B. Descriptive Analysis of Data  
a). First Compliance Indicator - Number of Personal Income Tax Files. 
As the first indicator, the number of new personal income tax files opened resulting from the 
amnesty can be calculated after removing the number of increase attributable to the normal 
pattern from the total increase of income tax files in 2003 and 2009.  
Table 4.1 shows the number of income tax files in Sri Lanka.5  Number of newly 
opened files for amnesty declarants has not been published. However, Figures of personal 
income tax files reported for 1997, 1998, 2003 and 2009 should include any new files opened 
as a result of amnesty. Once the effect of such drastic changes is removed from the number of 
files considering the average increase, we can glimpse the possible number of files in 
succeeding year and so on, as to arrive at increase without amnesty effects in 2003 and 2009. 
  
Table 3 – Annual Changes in Number of Personal Income Tax Files (1994 – 2009) 
 
Year Number of files Increase/Decrease of  
Files 
Percentage 
Growth Rate 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
115,608 
118,329 
126,399 
127,742 
131,718 
141,333 
145,513 
152,431 
155,346 
            158,267 
            158,906 
160,570 
161,302 
163,438 
200,418 
201,301 
                         -- 
                          2721
8070
1343
3976
9615
4180
6918
2915
2921
639
1664
732
2136
36980
883
                       -- 
                      2.35 
6.82 
1.06 
3.11 
7.30 
2.96 
4.75 
1.91 
1.88 
0.40 
1.05 
0.46 
1.32 
22.63 
0.44 
Source : Administration  Reports of Commissioner  General of Inland Revenue  
                                                 
5 Those who earn only employment income are registered under pay as you earn (PAYE) scheme and tax 
amount payable are withheld and remitted by employers.  Files are not maintained for them unless there are 
adjustments.  Furthermore, like in corporate tax files, the submission of amnesty declarations by this section is 
also minimal. 
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1997, 1998, 2003 and 2009 are amnesty years. The average annual increase of 
personal income tax files from 1994 to 2002 (except 1997 and 1998 amnesty years), has been 
5,736 approximately.  For this calculation we used data in Table 4.3 and did not consider 
increases of files experienced in 1997 and 1998, as a result of amnesty programmes 
implemented in those years. If 5,736 files are assumed and considered to be the reasonable 
average increase in accordance with the trend in pre-amnesty period, in 2003, the number of 
files should have been 161,082 (155,346 + 5,736), unless tax amnesty operated. Since the 
number of personal files at the end of 2003 remained at 158,267 the increase has been only 
2,921 files.   
Likewise, average annual increase of personal income tax files from 1994 to 2008 
(except 1997, 1998 and 2003 amnesty years), has been 6,961 approximately.  Based on this 
reasonable average increase experienced in pre-amnesty period, in 2009, the number of files 
should have been 207,379 unless tax amnesty was operated. Since the number of personal 
files at the end of 2009 remained at 201,301 compared to 200,418 in 2008, the increase has 
been only 883 files.  If we adjusted the annual average increase of 6,961 files that could have 
been possible under normal circumstances the number would have been around 207,379 in 
2009, ceteris paribus.   
Had the amnesties effectively brought new taxpayers to the books such a small 
increases would have not been observed. Thus our first variable shows on surface that the 
amnesties did not increase income tax files compared to the number of declarations and 
doubts prevail over the reaching of expected goals of the amnesties, “enhanced income tax 
compliance” by deterring tax evasion. 
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b). Second Compliance Indicator - Personal Income Tax Revenue. 
Post revenue increase resulting from a successful amnesty programme should 
overtake the pre amnesty average increase of revenue. Table 4.2 shows the government 
revenue, personal income tax revenue, personal income tax revenue as a percentage of 
government revenue and percentage growth of it.  Given the facts that the amnesty declarants 
were liable for current year taxes, it should show a steep increase in 2003 and 2009, had the 
amnesty successfully increased compliance. Increase of compliance of one tax tends to 
enhance compliance of the other taxes and ultimately the total tax revenue.   
Excluding the years 1997 and 1998 (amnesty years), the average annual increase of 
personal income tax revenue for the period from 1994 to 2002 was Rs.820 million.  On this 
basis, personal income tax revenue in 2003 should have been Rs.13076 million (12.256+ 820), 
unless tax amnesty was not in operation. But the real figure reported as only Rs 12773 
million with a slight increase of Rs.517 million. Likewise, average annual increase of 
personal income tax revenue from 1994 to 2008 (except 1997, 1998 and 2003 amnesty years), 
has been Rs.5000 million.  Based on this reasonable average increase experienced in pre-
amnesty period, in 2009, the number of files should have been Rs.67846 million unless tax 
amnesty was operated. But the real figure was only Rs.65321 million.  It concludes that both 
these amnesties have failed to maintain at least the pre amnesty trends in compliance 
indicators.  
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Table 4 –GDP, Government Revenue and Personal Income Tax Revenue 
 
Year GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
(Real 
Output) 
Per 
Capita 
GDP at 
Market 
Prices 
(Rupees) 
Government 
Revenue 
(Rupees 
Million) 
Percentage 
Increase of 
Government  
Revenue 
Personal 
income 
Tax 
Revenue 
(Rupees 
Million) 
Personal 
Income Tax 
Revenue as 
a 
Percentage 
of 
Government 
Revenue 
Percentage 
Growth of 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Revenue 
1995 5.5 36,869 136,258 -- 7,315 5.37 -- 
1996 3.8 41,940 146,279 7.35 7,358 5.03 0.59 
1997 6.3 50,292 165,037 12.82 8,183 4.96 11.21 
1998 4.7 56,780 175,032 6.06 8,199 4.68 0.20 
1999 4.3 60,741 195,905 11.93 9,169 4.68 11.83 
2000 6 68,102 211,282 7.85 10,820 5.12 18.01 
2001 -1.5 75.133 234,296 10.89 12,203 5.21 12.78 
2002 4 83,267 261,887 11.78 12,256 4.68 0.43 
2003 5.9 91,434 276,516 5.59 12,773 4.62 4.22 
2004 5.4 104,273 311,473 12.64 14,108 4.53 10.45 
2005 6.2 124,709 379,747 21.92 22,443 5.91 59.08 
2006 7.7 147,776 477,334 25.70 30,103 6.31 34.13 
2007 6.8 178,845 565,051 18.38 51,517 9.12 71.14 
2008 6 218,167 655,259 15.96 62,847 9.59 21.99 
2009 3.5 235,945 702,644 7.23 65,321 9.30 3.94 
Source:  Annual Reports of Central Bank of Sri Lanka  
C. Multi-Variable Analysis 
Initial descriptive data analysis of compliance revealed on surface that robust 
evidence as for an enhanced compliance status after the amnesty could not be visible. To 
come to a concrete conclusion a comprehensive quantitative analysis is needed. For this 
purpose this study proceeds further with an analysis using multiple variables. A multivariable 
analysis is useful when multiple factors affect the outcome. Thus, projections on depended 
variable - number of personal income tax files and personal income tax revenue - are 
extrapolated by using multivariable linear regression to measure the inclination of the lines of 
trend and to identify the difference of actual and predicted figures for 2003 and 2009.  Tax 
Amnesty labeled as Dummy Variable is used as an independent variable in addition to using 
other three independent variables named GDP, Inflation Rate and Effective Marginal Tax 
Rate  
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a).  First Compliance Indicator - Number of Personal Income Tax Files. 
The following multivariable linear regression equation is used to predict the behavior of 
number of files. 
 Y’ = a +b1X1+ b2X2 
Where, 
X1 =GDP ( Trillions) 
X2 = Dummy variable (Value 1’s for amnesty years and 0’s for non amnesty years) 
Y’ is the dependent variable which denotes number of personal income tax files. 
A dummy variable is used considering the tax amnesty in 2003, 2009 and other years.  Years 
with amnesties are given value, 1 while the value of the other years is considered as 0.  Value 
1 is given for 1997, 1998, 2003 and 2009 considering the amnesties declared in those years 
during the period from 1995 to 2009.  Table 4.6 shows the data used for regression. 
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Table 5 – Analyzed Data 
 
Year    GDP ( Trillions) Inflation Rate 
*Effective Marginal 
Tax Rate %
Tax Amnesty 
(Dummy)  No of IT files (,000) (Actual) 
IT Revenue (Billions) 
(Actual)  
1995 0.668 7.7 35 0 118.329 7.315 
1996 0.778 15.9 35 0 126.399 7.358 
1997 0.890 9.6 35 1 127.742 8.183 
1998 1.018 9.4 35 1 131.718 8.199 
1999 1.106 4.7 30 0 141.333 9.169 
2000 1.258 6.2 30 0 145.513 10.820 
2001 1.407 14.2 30 0 152.431 12.203 
2002 1.583 9.6 30 0 155.346 12.256 
2003 1.760 6.3 30 1 158.267 12.773 
2004 2.029 7.6 35 0 158.906 14.108 
2005 2.453 11.0 30 0 160.570 22.443 
2006 2.939 10.0 35 0 161.302 30.103 
2007 3.579 15.8 35 0 163.438 51.517 
2008 4.411 22.6 35 0 200.418 62.847 
2009 4.825 13.4 35 1 201.301 65.321 
                              *Effective marginal tax rate is the tax rate applicable for taxing the last slab of the individual’s taxable income. 
Sources:  Annual Reports of Central Bank of Sri Lanka /Administration Reports of Commissioner General of Inland Revenue 
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Table 6 – Regression Results for Number of Files 
 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT         
 
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.939749852        
R Square 0.883129784        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.863651415        
Standard Error 8.867348599        
Observations 15        
         
 
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F   
Regression 2 7129.999464 3564.999732 45.33900004 0.000002548138735593990   
Residual 12 943.558454 78.62987117     
Total 14 8073.557918        
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 118.8076371 4.485944744 26.48441831 0.000000000005145954091 109.0336031 128.581671 109.0336031 128.581671 
GDP( Trillions) 16.97811859 1.783968281 9.517051826 0.000000609755177457219 13.09118561 20.86505156 13.09118561 20.86505156 
Tax Amnesty  -0.099427387 5.180743714
-
0.019191721 0.985003576989189000000 -11.38729825 11.18844347 -11.38729825 11.18844347 
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RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT 
  
  
     
Observation 
Year Actual  No of IT 
files (,000) 
Predicted No of IT files 
(,000) Residuals 
1 1995 118.329 130.1490203 -11.82002031 
2 1996 126.399 132.0166134 -5.617613354 
3 1997 127.742 133.8187352 -6.07673525 
4 1998 131.718 135.9919344 -4.273934429 
5 1999 141.333 137.5854363 3.747563748 
6 2000 145.513 140.1661103 5.346889723 
7 2001 152.431 142.6958499 9.735150053 
8 2002 155.346 145.6839988 9.662001181 
9 2003 158.267 148.5896984 9.677301578 
10 2004 158.906 153.2562397 5.64976029 
11 2005 160.570 160.454962 0.115038008 
12 2006 161.302 168.7063276 -7.404327626 
13 2007 163.438 179.5723235 -16.13432352 
14 2008 200.418 193.6981182 6.71988181 
15 2009 201.301 200.6276319 0.673368101 
The equation concerning the number of files is as follows. 
 Y’ = a +b1X1+ b2X2 
 Y’ = 118.80 +16.97X1 – 0.09 X2 
R2  = 88.31% 
R2 denotes the total explanatory power of this equation. 88.31% of the total variation in the 
dependent variable that is “Number of Personal Income Tax Files” is explained by the 
variation in the independent variables, that is GDP (Trillions) and Dummy variable for amnesty 
years. 
F value = 78.45 
Using the “F distribution” we can calculate the critical value of F. At a 5% level of 
significance the critical value of F is 3.89. [Degrees of freedom for the numerator = k = 2, 
degrees of freedom for the denominator = n – (k+1) = 12]. The computed F is in the region 
of rejection because the computed F (45.33) is higher than critical value of F (3.89).  The 
null hypothesis (H0), that all "b" (all Coefficients) are equal to zero (Could the R2 occur by 
chance), is rejected since the computed F is in the region of rejection.  
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In this equation the coefficient for dummy variable; amnesty, is negative, although the 
significance of it is low with a higher p value (0.98). GDP is the most significant independent 
variable since the‘t’ value of 9.52 with a lower ‘p’ value of 0.0000006097. (Hypothesis 
testing for coefficients based on t values are given in appendix A). The reason for the lower 
significance of dummy variable could be the different movements of actual number of files in 
1997, 1998, 2003 and 2009 even with declaration of amnesties in these years. For example, 
as shown by the Table 4.1, actual number of personal income tax files has reported only a 
slight increase in these years. Thus the effects on files of all four amnesties introduced during 
the considered period could not be noticeable (A further explanation of this situation will 
follow after considering the tax revenue in the next section). However, coefficient for the 
dummy variable is negative showing an impact that it discourages the number of files. 
 Then R2 indicating the measure of fit of the predicted line to actual line stands at 
88.31% to show that the predicted line is very close to the actual line.  The actual umber of 
files and predicted number of files has a close overlapping as shown in the Figure 4.1.   
 
Figure 4.1 – Actual and Fitted Values of Personal Income Tax Files 
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b).  Second Compliance Indicator  -  Personal Income Tax Revenue. 
 
The following multivariable linear regression equation is used to predict the behavior of 
income tax revenue. 
 
 Y’ = a +b1X1+ b2X2+ b3X3+ b4X4 
Where, 
 X1 =GDP (Trillions) 
 X2 = Inflation Rate  
 X3 = Effective Marginal Tax Rate % 
X4 = Dummy variable for amnesty years (Value 1’s for amnesty years and 0’s for 
non amnesty years) 
Y’ is the dependent variable which denotes personal income tax revenue. 
A dummy variable is used considering the tax amnesty in 2003, 2009 and other years.  Years 
with amnesties are given value, 1 while the value of the other years is considered as 0.  Value 
1 is given for 1997, 1998, 2003 and 2009 considering the amnesties declared in those years 
during the period from 1995 to 2009.  Table 4.6 shows the data used for regression. 
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Table 7 – Regression Results for Personal Income Tax Revenue. 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT   
    
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.984438448
R Square 0.969119057
Adjusted R Square 0.95676668
Standard Error 4.275784582
Observations 15
 
 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept -28.27844252 15.70548387
-
1.800545768 0.101961555 -63.27244117 6.715556126
GDP( Trillions) 13.56038757 1.080553484 12.54948299 0.000000192 11.15276438 15.96801076
Inflation Rate 0.591077626 0.330750155 1.787081932 0.104220500 -0.145879642 1.328034893
Effective Marginal Tax Rate % 0.488750203 0.513683062 0.951462562 0.363799586 -0.655806981 1.633307387
Dummy(Tax Amnesty)  0.891354249 2.66996133 0.333845378 0.745391388 -5.057690298 6.840398796
 
ANOVA          
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 4 5737.440755 1434.360189 78.45607707 0.000000164165 
Residual 10 182.8233379 18.28233379    
Total 14 5920.264093      
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RESIDUAL OUTPUT 
Observation Year Predicted IT Revenue(Billions) Actual IT Revenue(Billions) Residuals
1 1995 2.437451185 7.315 4.877548815
2 1996 8.775930349 7.358 -1.417930349
3 1997 7.462258963 8.183 0.720741037
4 1998 9.079773047 8.199 -0.880773047
5 1999 4.159917049 9.169 5.009082951
6 2000 7.107712398 10.82 3.712287602
7 2001 13.85683115 12.203 -1.653831152
8 2002 13.52450229 12.256 -1.268502286
9 2003 14.86548897 12.773 -2.092488969
10 2004 20.8340309 14.108 -6.726030902
11 2005 26.14954815 22.443 -3.706548146
12 2006 34.59256989 30.103 -4.489569891
13 2007 46.69946816 51.517 4.817531836
14 2008 62.00103848 62.847 0.845961523
15 2009 63.06847902 65.321 2.252520979
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The equation concerning the Personal Income Tax Revenue is as follows. 
 Y’ = a +13.56X1+ 0.59X2+ 0.49b3X3+0.89X4 
R2  = 96.91% 
R2 denotes the total explanatory power of this equation. 96.91% of the total variation in the 
dependent variable, that is “Personal Income Tax Revenue”, is explained by the variation in 
the independent variables, that is GDP ( Trillions), Inflation Rate, Effective Marginal Tax Rate % 
and Dummy variable for amnesty years. 
F value = 78.45 
Using the “F distribution” we can calculate the critical value of F. At a 5% level of 
significance the critical value of F is 3.48. [Degrees of freedom for the numerator = k = 4, 
degrees of freedom for the denominator = n – (k+1) = 10]. The computed F is in the region 
of rejection because the computed F (78.45) is higher than critical value of F (3.48).  The 
null hypothesis (H0), that all "b" (all Coefficients) are equal to zero (Could the R2 occur by 
chance), is rejected since the computed F is in the region of rejection.  
With a higher t value of 12.54 and lower p value of 0.000000192, GDP is again the 
most significant variable. (Hypothesis testing for coefficients based on t values is given in 
appendix B).  Effective marginal tax rate with a t value of 0.95 and p value of 0.36% is not 
much significant and so is inflation rate with a t value of 1.78 having 0.104 as p value.  
Dummy variable has the lowest significance with a p value of 0.74 according to its t value of 
0.33.  Different movements of actual revenue in years 1997, 1998, 2003 and 2009 in which 
amnesties have been declared, could be the reason for the lower significance of dummy 
variable, in this case too.  As shown by the Table 4.2, actual revenue in 2003 has only a little 
increase compared to 2002 while actual revenue in 2009 has also a slight increase compared 
to 2008.  Thus the effects on revenue of all four amnesties introduced during the considered 
period could not be the same.    
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Measure of fit of the predicted line to the actual line, as shown by R2, stands at 
96.91%, showing that the predicted line is highly close to the actual line.   
 
Figure 4.2 – Actual and Fitted Values of Personal Income Tax Revenue 
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Figure 4.2 shows the actual line and fitted line of personal income tax revenue.  The predicted 
line of tax revenue follows the actual line reflecting a low dispersion. 
  
D. Research Findings 
By using the dummy variable (as 1), effect of the amnesty has been considered for the 
estimated lines of both number of personal income tax files and personal income tax revenue.  
As per the regression results, coefficient in dummy variable, amnesty, is negative in equation 
concerning number of personal income tax files suggesting that amnesty discourages files. 
With regard to the personal income tax revenue it is non significant although positive in 
equation.  However, the dummy variable shows the lowest significance in both equations.   
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We have projected number of personal income tax files and personal income tax 
revenue for the period by considering some of the probable variables to affect such 
compliance indicators, in a multivariable analysis.  Convincing evidence was not found for a 
considerable rise of short run compliance in case of 2003 and 2009 amnesties in Sri Lanka 
according to the indicators that were tested within our methodology.6 
As the most popular amnesty programmes in the history of Sri Lankan amnesties, 
2003 and 2009 amnesties raised altogether 72,200 declarations as reported.  But such 
declarations were not reflected by corresponding increases of personal income tax files.  Thus, 
even the prevailing trend of increase of files has not been maintained after the amnesty as 
discussed in the descriptive analysis.  This reveals that amnesty declarations were not 
effectively instrumental in enhancing number of taxpayers. 
Amnesties under which back taxes are not payable should be highly attractive among 
wrong –doers as we have hypothesized in Chapter Two.  The only liability they have to meet 
relates to the future taxes, while whole of their past acts can be corrected without being 
subjected to punishment and investigations.  In addition, psychic costs of stress and stigma of 
a future detection could also be avoided by this.  However, this study does not show a 
considerable increase of tax revenue even with declaration over 72,000. It suggests that most 
of the evaders, who are out of the tax net at the moment, still want to remain as evaders.   
The above findings as a whole suggest that 2003 and 2009 amnesties, even with huge 
number of declarations do not seem to be successful in increasing the number of tax payers 
and revenue.   
 
 
 
                                                 
6 However it is meticulously proven fact by Alm et al (1990) that amnesties without increased enforcement 
undermine the long run compliance. 
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Circumstances Behind the Research Findings 
A vast majority of previous theoretical and empirical literature shows that tax 
amnesties mostly undermine compliance, especially when introduced repeatedly.  
Nevertheless, some literature has emphasized immediate increases of compliance after an 
amnesty programme.  However, declines in the long-term compliance as well as negligible or 
negative revenue effects have also been discussed by previous work. 
In addition to multivariable analysis, in a descriptive analysis, we explained the 
fluctuations of the number of files and revenue of personal income tax during amnesty 
periods in 2003 and 2009. We found that there has been reluctance from non-taxpayers to 
come to the tax net under amnesties in Sri Lanka.  There can be several reasons behind such 
outcomes.  In line with the literature reviewed and the facts that were hypothesized by us in 
the second chapter, such reasons can be analyzed in two flows 
 
a). Problems with Repeated Amnesties 
Introduction of repeated amnesties seems, first to lead the taxpayers and non-
taxpayers to understand the inability of the governments to enforce taxation effectively and, 
finally to exacerbation of the state of compliance and the whole tax system. Even though a 
considerable decline of compliance indicators after the amnesty could not be seen, many tax 
cheats in Sri Lanka seem to be waiting for another opportunity that will come later.  Besides, 
the declaration of an amnesty as the last one might not have been effective since there had 
been previous amnesties introduced in the same way.   
 
b). Problems with follow up enforcement  
Theoretically, amnesties might provide positive effects on tax compliance only when 
they are followed by a strong enforcement mechanism.  2003 and 2009 amnesties did not 
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seem to be followed by an enhanced and vigorous enforcement mechanism.  Psychologically , 
when there is no or less risk of being detected and punishment, there is no need for evaders to 
come under an amnesty considering the liability for future taxes, which most probably be 
exonerated by a future amnesty programme according to the past experience.  Tax evaders 
with colossal amounts of past evasions and future probable taxes might go on this way with 
the help of weaknesses in tax system. In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, taxpayers always have 
a higher risk of detection than non- taxpayers. Possibility of getting away by using 
weaknesses of tax administration is always available for non tax payers.   They can still 
continue evading, since there is no high probability of an immediate detection within the 
weak enforcement.  Risks of evasion are not high in a state of weak enforcement.  Hence 
such weaknesses seem to have deprived non- taxpayers of coming under the amnesty. 
 
c). Dissatisfaction among Current Tax Payers  
On the other hand, dissatisfaction among honest taxpayers, who have already paid 
their past dues for which declarants are exonerated, could be one reason for the decline of 
current revenue. In this background, most of the declarations under 2003 and 2009 amnesties 
seem to have been made by the existing taxpayers whilst the amnesty seems less attractive to 
tax cheats among non- taxpayers.   
 
d). Weaknesses within the Sri Lankan Tax Administration 
Effective administration of all facilitating measures of tax compliance makes the way 
for reaching a higher level of compliance in a country.  Even though a tax administration has 
effective strategies to enhance compliance, hindrances affecting smooth functioning of them 
in practice, can arise within the system itself.  Certain amount of criticism over administrative 
weaknesses such as lack of expertise and corruption of tax officials prevail in Sri Lanka too.  
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Lack of both physical and human resources and inadequate provision of taxpayer services, 
especially in the field of consultancy and tax education, form the other weaknesses.  
Inadequate taxpayer services lead the taxpayers to seek for professional advice, making 
compliance less effective. 
Understatement of income and overstatement of expenses or use of any other means 
to reduce tax liabilities take place as long as the aforesaid weaknesses prevail within the tax 
system.  For example, official who are not competent enough or corrupted weaken tax 
administration’s effort and become means for tax cheats to under-declaration of tax liabilities 
or escape from detections.  In this situation compliance is affected in any facet, whether it is 
filing, reporting or payment thus undermining the overall compliance.  Then it leads to non-
compliance and tax evasion. 
As per findings and analysis of this study the major share of amnesty declarations 
seems to have come from those who are already in the tax registers.  This situation itself 
reveals another crucial aspect.  How could such a huge number of taxpayers who are under 
scrutiny of the tax administration conceal their evasions, if not for the weaknesses in this 
system itself?  Conditions seem to work favorably for evaders.  Even if evasions are not 
revealed under an amnesty and later detected and caught they still have a chance to escape by 
using the weaknesses of tax administration.  Hence, the status quo of the Sri Lankan tax 
system seems to be sluggish towards achieving compliance, due to weaknesses of tax 
administration.  
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CHPTER FIVE 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
This study proved that personal income tax compliance has not been considerably 
affected by the introduction of 2003 and 2009 tax amnesties.  Personal income tax files and 
personal income tax revenue have not increased after the amnesty suggesting that amnesties 
could perform contrary to the objectives of introducing them, when weaknesses in a tax 
system and administration prevail.  It confirms, therefore, the idea that if the problems of a 
tax system are not addressed by an amnesty, it is likely to do more harm than good, as 
pointed out by Alm (1998). Hence, tax amnesties are not a universal remedy and cannot cure 
all ills in a tax system. In this background it is doubtful whether problems facing the Sri 
Lankan tax system can be addressed by an amnesty.  If the practice of introducing frequent 
amnesties continues instead of a proper understanding of the problems and dealing with them 
by using competent strategies, optimal personal income tax compliance might be difficult to 
achieve.  Only a continuation of a probable vicious circle of amnesties is the worst case 
scenario in such a situation. 
 
 
According to preceding paragraphs, reason for frequent amnesties in any country 
seems to be inspired from none reaching of compliance to the expected level even after 
Taxpayers after the 
amnesty- 
Concealment of income 
Introduction of 
an Amnesty 
Some existing/new taxpayers- 
Introduction of undisclosed/ 
evaded income 
Non-compliance/ 
Tax Evasion 
Administrative problems/ 
weaknesses leading to weak 
enforcement and facilitation 
of compliance. 
Non-taxpayers-
easy escape 
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introduction of an amnesty.  However, in my view a vicious cycle of frequent amnesties 
might exist, when the circumstances to undermine income tax compliance continue to prevail.  
Figure 5.1 describes this situation.   
The objective of introducing tax amnesties in Sri Lanka has been securing future 
compliance.  According to established theory, tax amnesties, which are better to be avoided 
unless excellent and inarguable reason for declaration of them is found, undermine 
compliance in the long-run, while bringing negative revenue effects.  Moreover, frequent 
amnesties discourage honest taxpayers and even the tax cheats keep on waiting; anticipating 
further amnesties in this situation.   
Furthermore, since the back taxes are not collected by Sri Lankan tax amnesties, the 
exchequer seems to be in loosing end even in the short-run in addition to the long-run, where 
achieving other long term objectives of amnesties looks controversial.     
Considering the present situation of the Sri Lankan tax system following 
recommendations can be made. 
First, further Tax amnesties should be avoided in Sri Lanka according to the 
prevailing situation.  Tax amnesties, which are identified as a controversial revenue tool in 
many researches even when back taxes are collected under them, do not seem to have 
achieved its objectives in Sri Lankan case too, in which full immunity is granted, expecting 
only an increase of compliance. 
Secondly, a vigorous and effective enforcement mechanism should be implemented. 
Adequate human and physical resources should be provided for conducting investigations 
and audits sufficiently.  With the goal of upgrading the investigation and enforcement, staff 
training programmes should emphasize providing necessary expertise with auditing and tax 
legislation as to tackle cases. Technical expertise and vigilance of the officials lead to 
thoroughness of audits including field investigations 
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When corruption prevails in the tax administration, cases of evasion do not come to 
the surface and/ or are mishandled to affect government tax revenue.  Hence, thirdly, as a 
vital feature of compliance enforcement and facilitation, prevention of officials’ misconduct 
and corruption must also be ensured by education and improving their moral courage and 
citizenship behavior. Not only monetary benefits like maintaining of proper salary standards 
but morale boosting activities will also be fruitful.  Moreover, upgrading internal control will 
be effective for countering this weakness.  Furthermore, taxpayers and general public also 
have to be educated in this respect. 
Finally, and more importantly, attention should be paid to facilitating compliance by 
avoiding weaknesses in this aspect.  Tax compliance in Sri Lanka seems to be hampered by 
lack of awareness about taxes that lead to high compliance costs.  In addition, existence of 
reluctance among the public to visit tax offices increases cases of evasion.  A long – term 
plan to enhance public relations activities and island wide tax education programmes should 
be implemented. The Sri Lankan tax administration already has a little experience in this 
regard. Year 2008 was a remarkable year in which 36,980 new tax payers came to the tax net 
reporting a 22.63% annual progress in number of personal income tax files through 
implementation of a successful non-amnesty tax-base widening programes.  Although costly, 
such progrmmes will certainly deliver the goods in the long-run, in comparison to un-secured 
future compliance and huge tax cuts granted by tax amnesties. Persuading the public to think 
about the other side of  the government ledger, public services and other benefits, provided in 
return for  taxes paid, makes them understand the  importance of taxes.  Effective public 
relations and tax education are steps for providing the nation with a tax paying culture that 
sets social norms and a national mindset for that purpose in the long –run. For this purpose 
policy changes and new strategies might be necessary. 
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APPENDIX - A 
 
 
First Compliance Indicator - Number of Personal Income Tax Files. 
 Y’ = 118.80 +16.97X1 – 0.09 X2 
 
t Statistics for the coefficients 
Using the “t distribution” we can calculate the critical value of t. At a 5% level of 
significance the critical value of t is 2.179. [Degrees of freedom = n – (k+1) = 12].  
 
Coefficient Test Significance 
b1 The computed t is in the region of rejected because the 
computed t (9.52) is higher than critical value of t 
(2.179).  The null hypothesis (H0), that “b1” (Coefficient) 
is equal to zero, is rejected since the computed t is in the 
region of rejected.  
 
Significant 
b2 The computed t is in the region of not rejected because 
the computed t (0.02) is lower than critical value of t 
(2.179).  The null hypothesis (H0), that “b2” (Coefficient) 
is equal to zero, is not rejected since the computed t is in 
the region of not rejected.  
 
Not significant 
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APPENDIX - B 
 
Second Compliance Indicator - Personal Income Tax Revenue. 
 Y’ = a +13.56X1+ 0.59X2+ 0.49b3X3+0.89X4 
 
t Statistics for the coefficients 
Using the “t distribution” we can calculate the critical value of t. At a 5% level of 
significance the critical value of t is 2.228. [Degrees of freedom = n – (k+1) = 10].  
 
Coefficient Test Significance 
b1 The computed t is in the region of rejected because the 
computed t (12.55) is higher than critical value of t 
(2.228).  The null hypothesis (H0), that “b1” (Coefficient) 
is equal to zero, is rejected since the computed t is in the 
region of rejected.  
Significant 
b2 The computed t is in the region of not rejected because 
the computed t (1.79) is lower than critical value of t 
(2.228).  The null hypothesis (H0), that “b2” (Coefficient) 
is equal to zero, is not rejected since the computed t is in 
the region of not rejected.  
Not significant 
b3 The computed t is in the region of not rejected because 
the computed t (0.95) is lower than critical value of t 
(2.228).  The null hypothesis (H0), that “b3” (Coefficient) 
is equal to zero, is not rejected since the computed t is in 
the region of not rejected.  
Not significant 
b4 The computed t is in the region of not rejected because 
the computed t (0.33) is lower than critical value of t 
(2.228).  The null hypothesis (H0), that “b4” (Coefficient) 
is equal to zero, is not rejected since the computed t is in 
the region of not rejected.  
 
Not significant 
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